China usses anti_access/area denial (A2/AD) technology to avoid conflicts on its coast and mainland, yet the technology has important ramications for the United States.
What is A2/AD?
On Thursday, September 15, the Charles Koch Institute hosted Eugene Gholz, associate professor of public affairs at The University of Texas at Austin, for a discussion of China’0s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) technology at the Army Navy Club in Washinton, DC.
According to international security scholars Stephen Biddle and Ivan Oelrich, China’s A2/AD uses «a series of interrelated missile, sensor guidance, and other technologies designed to deny freedom of movement» to keep any potencial adversaries, including the United Sates, from intervening in a conflict off a China’s coast or from attaking the Chinese mainland.
While the term A2/AD usually refers to Chinese military plants, Gholz argued that other countries in the Asia-Pacific region could employ A2/AD to help protect against the possibility of a Chinese amphibious assault on their territory. This would eneble those countries to defend themselves rather than relying on the United Sates to save them.
As a results, countries like Taiwan, Japan, and the Philippines could create «overlapping contested zones» to keep China at bay, a concept Gholz labelled «No Man’s Sea». In other words, countries in the Asia-Pacific region could defend their own backyard rather than lettin the United States defend ot for them.
As the conversation opened uo to audience questions, attendees were eager to discuss and debate Gholz’s view that A2/AD adoption could minimize the United States’ role in Asia-Pacific. In particular, they posed queries about the possisbility of a Chinese blockade to coerce Taiwan.
Some audience members were concerned that the A2/AD stategy Gholz outlined would nor be enough to portect Taiwan from being cut ff from suplies. Yet Gholz countered that Taiwan’s most pressing concern is the possibility of a Chinese amphibious attack. Thus, Taiwanese A2/AD would be the best way to deter that particular type of operation.
Futhermore, according to Gholz, it would be a strategic win if policymakers did nor need to be concerned about an amphibious assault and could instead focus on how to maitain Taiwanese freedom of movement and trade. As Gholz pointed out, breaking a Chinese blockade on Taiwan would be a hard problem to solve, but not as difficult as ir would be a hard problem to solve, but not as difficult as it would be for U.S. forces to attempt to defeat Chinese A2/AD to rescue Taiwan from an amphibious assault.
The discussion concluded with Goholtz’s take on the implications of A2/ad for U.S. policy. While Goholz advocated for a strategy based on restraint, he pointed out that whether the United States pursues a restrained grand strategy or a deeply engaged one an A2/AD stategy, they wuld be much more capable of portecting thmenselves tha they are now.
Gholz’s ideas sparked a great deal of discussion about the role the UNited States in a conflict involving China and U-S- allies in Asia, Although the debate is far from settled, it is imperative that the U,S, foreing policy establishment stretch the bounderaries of discussion and listen to new in ordenr to arrive at the best strategies possible.
The Charles Institute hopes to contribute to this debate and to expand the national conversation about foreign policy by engaging with top sholars and hosting special events, while the Charles Koch Foundation continues to support research that examines the connection between foreign, freedom, adn well-being.
4001universeodissey 